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Abstract
This paper proposes a generic method to revise
traditional neural networks for privacy protection.
Our method is designed to prevent inversion at-
tacks, i.e. avoiding recovering private information
from intermediate-layer features of a neural net-
work. Our method transforms real-valued features
of an intermediate layer into complex-valued fea-
tures, in which private information is hidden in
a random phase of the transformed features. To
prevent the adversary from recovering the phase,
we adopt an adversarial-learning algorithm to gen-
erate the complex-valued feature. More crucially,
the transformed feature can be directly processed
by the deep neural network, but without knowing
the true phase, people cannot recover either the
input information or the prediction result. Prelim-
inary experiments with various neural networks
(including the LeNet, the VGG, and residual net-
works) on different datasets have shown that our
method can successfully defend feature inversion
attacks while preserving learning accuracy.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have shown superb capa-
bilities to process different types of local devices such as
mobile phones, medical equipment, Internet of Things (IoT)
devices have become the data entry points in recent years.
Although on-device machine learning has exhibited various
advantages, it usually burdens the thin devices with over-
whelming computational overhead. Yet, offloading raw data
to the cloud would put the individual privacy at risk. Hence
a trade-off solution is to offload intermediate feature repre-
sentations, rather than the raw data, to the cloud for further
processing.
However, as shown in (Dosovitskiy & Brox, 2016),
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intermediate-layer features are subject to inversion attacks,
i.e. recovering the input data from features of intermedi-
ate layers. It means that an adversary can launch attacks
to recover any sensitive information in the input from the
offloaded features on the cloud.
Therefore, in this paper, we propose a novel method to re-
vise a traditional neural network into a privacy-preserving
complex-valued neural network. Note that the network is
termed a complex-valued neural network, because features
in intermediate layers are complex-valued for privacy pro-
tection, rather than that network parameters are complex-
valued.
We release intermediate-layer complex-valued features to
the cloud without significant privacy leaks. As shown in
Fig. 1, the entire network can be divided into the following
three modules.
• The encryption module is embedded inside a local
device of a human user. The encryption module ex-
tracts features from the input, encrypts the features,
and sends the encrypted features to the cloud.
For conciseness, we slightly abuse terms such as en-
cryption and decryption without confusing them with
their counterparts in cryptographic contexts.
• The processing module is located on the public cloud.
This module receives and processes the encrypted fea-
ture without knowing the secret key and returns the
processed feature back to the human user.
• The decryption module on the local device of a user
receives and decrypts the processed features and gener-
ates the final result.
We face two significant challenges in the above inference
process. First, the feature f in the intermediate layers con-
tains considerable sensitive information about the input I ,
which can be recovered by an adversary who trains a de-
coder neural network g such that Iˆ = g(f). Our objective
is to design f such that the adversary cannot well recover I
from f .
Second, ensuring that the encrypted feature can be pro-
cessed by the neural network without sacrificing the utility
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Figure 1. Structure of the complex-valued neural network.
too much presents another great challenge. Different net-
work structures are designed to handle different types of
data — convolutional neural networks (CNNs) are designed
for images, and recurrent neural networks (RNNs) mainly
deal with sequential data. Piecewise linear feature represen-
tations in neural networks are widely believed not suitable to
handle strict high-order logic. Hence our second objective
is to let the encrypted feature be processable by the neural
network.
We propose to hide the private information of the input
in a random phase of a complex-valued feature. Given a
neural network for a certain task, we develop a simple-yet-
effective method to adapt the neural network for processing
the complex-valued features. Note that the same training
data is required to train such a neural network as the original
neural network, without a need for any additional human
annotations.
More importantly, to prevent the true phase corresponding
to the feature from being re-identified, we use adversarial
learning to synthesize complex-valued features, so that the
real feature can be hidden better. Without knowing the
phase, any adversary cannot obtain either the private input
or the final output given the intermediate-layer feature.
Contributions of this study can be summarized as fol-
lows. We propose a novel method which transforms a tra-
ditional neural network into a complex-valued one, such
that the adversary cannot recover input information from
the intermediate-layer features. Our complex-valued neural
network is verified by experiments on various datasets and
network structures to be able to successfully defend feature
inversion attacks with a very limited decrease of the task
accuracy.
2. Related Work
Complex-valued neural networks. Using complex-valued
features or complex-valued parameters in neural networks
has always been an interesting topic. From the computa-
tional perspective, complex-valued neural networks have a
competitive performance with their real-valued counterparts
(Trabelsi et al., 2018). By augmenting recurrent neural net-
works with associative memory based on complex-valued
vectors, (Danihelka et al., 2016) achieved faster learning
on memorization tasks. Complex-valued features can con-
tain information in both the phase and the magnitude. An
example is that Reichert et al. used the phase to indicate
properties of spike timing in cortical information process-
ing (Reichert & Serre, 2013). In our research, the phase
contains the user’s private information without which the
original feature of the input cannot be exactly identified.
Inversion attacks. The intermediate-layer features released
to the public have been shown to be vulnerable to inversion
attacks (Dosovitskiy & Brox, 2016). To invert intermediate-
layer features, a typical method (Dosovitskiy & Brox, 2016)
is to train a decoder with up-convolutional layers to recon-
struct the input. Given parameters of a pre-trained model,
gradient-based visualization (Zeiler & Fergus, 2014; Ma-
hendran & Vedaldi, 2015; Simonyan et al., 2013) can be
used for reconstruction. Whereas, without knowing model
parameters, the model-agnostic decoder network is usually
used to recover private inputs.
Privacy-preserving deep learning. Various privacy-
preserving mechanisms have been proposed using differ-
ent definitions of privacy: (Osia et al., 2017) applied the
Siamese architecture to separate the primary and private
information so that the primary information was preserved
in the feature. PrivyNet (Li et al., 2017) was proposed to
decide the local neural network structure under the privacy
constraint based on the peak signal-to-noise ratio or the
pixel-wise Euclidean distance. Data nullification and ran-
dom noise addition were introduced by (Wang et al., 2018)
to protect private information in the features, which guaran-
teed differential privacy. (Shokri & Shmatikov, 2015) and
(Abadi et al., 2016) proposed privacy mechanisms based on
the differentially-private stochastic gradient descent (Song
et al., 2013) to prevent the adversary with arbitrary side
information from telling private inputs.
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Cryptographic tools have been used to learn from the sen-
sitive data. Zhang et al. (Zhang et al., 2016) adopted ho-
momorphic encryption, in particular, BGV encryption, to
encrypt the private data and perform the high-order back-
propagation on the encrypted data; (Mohassel & Zhang,
2017) distributed the private data among two non-colluding
servers who performed the secure two-party computation to
train models on the joint data.
The privacy definition suggested by our work is similar to k-
anonymity in the sense that the adversary could reconstruct
at least k different inputs from a transformed feature so that
the adversary would be confused in identifying the correct
input from reconstruction results.
3. Algorithm
The structure of our privacy-preserving neural network is
shown by Fig. 1, which consists of an encryption module,
a processing module, and a decryption module. The three
modules are jointly trained as a single neural network. Dur-
ing the inference, the encryption and decryption modules
are placed on local devices, while the processing module is
located on the computational cloud for public use.
Let I ∈ I denote an input in the dataset and g be the en-
cryption module at the local device. The feature of I is
computed locally as
a = g(I), (1)
but we do not directly release a. Instead, we introduce
a fooling counterpart b, which we will elaborate later to
construct the complex-valued feature
x = exp(iθ)
[
a+ bi
]
, (2)
where the angle θ is randomly chosen and only known by
the local device. The fooling counterpart b is selected such
that it does not contain any private information of a, and it is
sufficient to cause confusion. The encrypted feature is then
sent to the processing module Φ for further processing. The
processing module sends the processed feature h = Φ(x)
back to the local device, which is also a complex value.
Upon receiving h, the decryption module in the local device
decrypts h as follows.
yˆ = d(<[exp(−iθ) · h]). (3)
d can be the last few layers of the neural network or just a
softmax layer, depending on the amount of information to
be processed locally. <(·) denotes the operation of picking
real parts of complex values.
Overall, the entire neural network [g,Φ, d] should be trained
over the original training dataset without any additional su-
pervision. Once trained, all parameters of the three modules
may be publicly known. At the inference, the local device
secretly selects a fooling counterpart b and the rotation angle
θ to encrypt its feature. In later sections, we will focus on
the encryption method, which ensures that the encrypted
complex-valued feature x can be properly handled by Φ and
d.
3.1. Processing Module
The key challenge of designing the processing module Φ
is that the complex-valued feature should be adapted to
the neural network operations. The objective is that if
we rotate the complex-valued feature a + bi by an angle
θ, all intermediate-layer features are rotated by the same
angle. We represent the processing module as cascaded
functions of multiple layers Φ(x) = Φn(Φn−1(· · ·Φ1(x)),
where Φj(·) denotes the function of the j-th layer. Let
fj = Φj(fj−1) represent the output feature of the j-th layer.
Thus, the processing module should hold the following prop-
erty:
Φ(f (θ)) = eiθΦ(f)
s.t. f (θ)
def
==== eiθf, ∀θ ∈ [0, 2pi).
(4)
In other words, the function of each intermediate layer in
the processing module should satisfy
Φj(f
(θ)
j−1) = e
iθΦj(fj−1)
s.t. f (θ)j−1
def
==== eiθfj−1, ∀j ∈ [2, . . . , n], ∀θ ∈ [0, 2pi).
(5)
to recursively prove Eqn. (4).
Let us consider six most common types of network layers
to construct the processing module, i.e. the conv-layer, the
ReLU layer, the batch-normalization layer, the average/max
pooling layer, the dropout layer, and the skip-connection
operation. For the conv-layer, we remove the bias term and
obtain Conv(f) = w ⊗ f to satisfy Eqn. (5).
We replace the ReLU with the following non-linear layer:
δ(fijk) =
‖fijk‖
max{‖fijk‖, c} · fijk (6)
where fijk denotes the neural unit at the location (i, j) in the
k-th channel of the feature map, and c is a hyper-parameter.
The batch-normalization operation is replaced by
norm(f lijk) =
f lijk√
Eijl[‖f lijk‖2]
, (7)
where f l denotes the complex-valued tensor for the l-th
sample in the batch.
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For max-pooling layers, we modify the rule such that the
neural activation unit with the maximum norm in the region
is selected. The modified max-pooling layer does not change
the phase of its input. For the dropout layer, we apply the
dropout operation at the unit of each individual complex
value with both the real part and the imaginary part. Skip
connections can be formulated as f +Φ(f), where the inner
module Φ(f) also satisfies Eqn. (4).
All above six operations satisfy Eqn. (4). Please see supple-
mentary materials for the proof.
3.2. Encryption Module
The objective of the encryption module is to hide the real
feature a of the input I in a certain phase θ∗ of the encrypted
complex-valued feature x = exp(iθ∗)
[
a + bi
]
. Let a′ =
<[x exp(−iθ′)] = <[(a + bi) exp(iθ∗ − iθ′)] = <[(a +
bi) exp(i∆θ)] denote a fake feature that is decrypted using
a random angle θ′ 6= θ∗, where ∆θ = θ∗− θ′. A successful
encryption requires (i) the fake feature a′ contains little
information of the real feature a; (ii) the fake feature a′
and the real one a follow the same distribution so that it is
difficult to distinguish the real feature from fake ones.
Therefore, we can formulate the encryption problem using
the following adversarial loss:
min
g,{bI |bI 6=a,I∈I}
max
D
L(g, {bI}, D)
s.t. L(g, {bI}, D) =
∑
I∈I
{
D(a)− Ea′ 6=a
[
D(a′)
]}
=
∑
I∈I
{
D[g(I)]− E∆θ 6=0
[
D
[<[(g(I) + bI i) exp(i∆θ)]]]}.
(8)
In the adversarial learning module, a discriminator network
D is learned to classify the real feature a from the fake fea-
ture a′. We follow the technical setting of the W-GAN (Ar-
jovsky et al., 2017) to implement the adversarial learning
to generate features. The encryption module g is trained
along with the imaginary part of the feature bI to fool the
discriminator D, while D is trained to distinguish a and a′.
Thus, the overall loss for learning is given as follows:
Loss = L(g, {bI}, D) + Ltask(yˆ, y∗) (9)
where Ltask(yˆ, y∗) represents the task loss over the targeted
output y∗.
Note that to simplify the implementation, we compute bI =
g(I ′) as the feature of a randomly chosen sample I ′ 6= I , to
fool the discriminator. In this way, the estimation of bI in
Eqn. (8) is absorbed in the optimization of the encryption
module g. Since the expectation in Eqn. (8) is taken over
all possible ∆θ 6= 0, in practice, we sample k − 1 non-
zero values of ∆θ, and iterate through these k − 1 values
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Figure 2. Overview of baseline network structures.
as negatives in the adversarial learning. The adversarial-
learning module ensures that at least k − 1 fake features are
generated resembling the real one, i.e. when an adversary
tries to recover a from x by reverting an arbitrary angle θ′,
it would recover at least k − 1 other features along with a.
Understanding the feature encryption from the perspec-
tive of inversion-attack strategies: The adversarial loss in
Eqn. (8) can explain the effectiveness of the complex-valued
feature in privacy protection concerning two inversion attack
strategies.
Strategy 1: The adversary tries to find out the most
likely rotated angle θˆ to revert the feature x to obtain
a, and inverting a by a decoder network dec such that
Iˆ = dec(<[x exp(−iθˆ)]). An example is to build a discrim-
inator D′ such that θˆ = maxθD′(<[x exp(−iθ)]). How-
ever, the adversarial loss in Eqn. (8) ensures that given a
well-learned encryption module g, it is challenging to learn
a powerful discriminator D′ to distinguish the real features
from others.
Strategy 2: The adversary tries to directly decode the tar-
geted input from the encrypted feature that Iˆ = dec(x).
Then we prove that the adversarial-learning loss in Eqn. (8)
also boosts the difficulty of learning a powerful decoder
Iˆ = dec(x). Let g = g∗ and D = D∗ denote the opti-
mized encryption module and the discriminator according
to Eqn. (8). Based on the encryption module g, we can con-
struct a discriminator as Dˆ(a′) = −‖g∗(I)− g∗(dec(a′))‖.
BecauseD∗ is learned viaD∗ = arg maxD L(g∗, {bI}, D),
we get L(g∗, {bI}, D∗) ≥ L(g∗, {bI}, Dˆ). The adversarial
loss in Eqn. (8) provides the upper bound of L(g∗, {bI}, Dˆ),
and thus restricts the capability of the decoder.
4. Experiments
In experiments, we applied our privacy-preserving approach
to eight CNNs with classical structures to demonstrate the
broad applicability of the proposed method. Without loss of
generality, we tested on tasks such as object classification
and face attribute estimation, and the method can also be
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Figure 3. CIFAR-10 images reconstructed from ‘encrypted’ features on a variety of LeNet-based neural networks.
Classification Error Rates Reconstruction Errors
Dataset Original Network with Ours Original Network with Ours Ours
network additional layers network additional layers dec(<[x exp(−iθˆ)]) dec(x)
ResNet-20-α CIFAR-10 11.56 9.68 10.91 0.0906 0.1225 0.2664 0.2420
ResNet-20-β CIFAR-10 11.99 9.79 12.28 0.0967 0.1210 0.2424 0.2420
ResNet-32-α CIFAR-10 11.13 9.67 10.48 0.0930 0.1171 0.2569 0.2412
ResNet-32-β CIFAR-10 10.91 9.40 11.12 0.0959 0.1189 0.2515 0.2425
ResNet-44-α CIFAR-10 10.67 9.43 11.08 0.0933 0.1109 0.2746 0.2419
ResNet-44-β CIFAR-10 10.50 10.15 10.51 0.0973 0.1210 0.2511 0.2397
ResNet-56-α CIFAR-10 10.17 9.16 11.53 0.0989 0.1304 0.2804 0.2377
ResNet-56-β CIFAR-10 10.78 9.04 11.28 0.0907 0.1176 0.2585 0.2358
ResNet-110-α CIFAR-10 10.19 9.14 11.97 0.0896 0.1079 0.3081 0.2495
ResNet-110-β CIFAR-10 10.21 9.36 11.85 0.0932 0.1152 0.2582 0.2414
Table 1. Experimental results based on residual networks using the CIFAR-10 dataset.
applied to deep models for other tasks.
We evaluate our approach from two aspects: the perfor-
mance of the task and the privacy-preserving performance.
The latter was measured by three metrics under two typical
inversion strategies, as well as the qualitative visualization
of the recovered inputs. We compared the proposed method
with three baselines. Experimental results demonstrated the
superior performance of our method in privacy protection to
baselines with a very limited decrease of the discrimination
power.
4.1. Implementation Details
We revised a neural network into a complex-valued neural
network as follows. First, the neural network was divided
into the encryption, processing, and decryption modules.
The division of each network will be introduced later. Sec-
ond, an adversarial learning module was attached to the first
few layers composing the encryption module. The adversar-
ial learning module included a generator and a discrimina-
tor. The generator consisted of a convolutional layer with
3× 3×K filters, and the discriminator was composed by a
convolutional layer as well as a fully-connected layer. The
output of the generator was rotated by a randomly selected
angle before feeding to the processing module.
To adapt to complex-valued features, in the processing mod-
ule of the residual networks, we set c = 1 for the revised
non-linear layers δ(·). Except for the residual networks,
other baseline neural networks did not contain normalization
layers in the processing module, so we set ck = Eij‖x′ijk‖
for neural activations in the k-th channel.
Modular division of neural networks: In total, we re-
vised eight neural networks: the 1st to the 5th are residual
networks (He et al., 2016) with 20, 32, 44, 56, 110 con-
volutional layers, which are termed ResNet-20, ResNet-32,
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Figure 4. CUB200-2011 images reconstructed from ‘encrypted’ features on a variety of VGG-16-based neural networks.
ResNet-44, ResNet-56, and ResNet-110, respectively. The
6th, 7th, and 8th neural networks were the LeNet (LeCun
et al., 1998), the VGG-16 (Simonyan & Zisserman, 2015),
and the AlexNet (Krizhevsky et al., 2012), respectively.
The assignment of the encryption/processing/decryption
modules of each network is as follows. For the residual
network, we tested two variations of it — ResNet-α and
ResNet-β. In the ResNet-α network, the output of the layer
before the first 16×16 feature map was fed to the adversarial
learning module, and thus its encryption module included
the adversarial learning module and the layers before it.
Layers following the first 8× 8 feature map constituted the
decryption module. All layers in between were the process-
ing module. In the ResNet-β network, the encryption and
processing modules were the same as the ResNet-α, while
the last residual block with its following layers constituted
the decryption module.
For the LeNet, the encryption module consisted of the first
convolutional layer as well as the adversarial-learning mod-
ule, while the decryption module contained the softmax
layer. The VGG-16 used all layers before the last 56× 56
feature map and the adversarial-learning module as its en-
cryption module. Fully-connected layers and the softmax
layer were the decryption module. For the AlexNet, the
output of the first three conv-layer was fed into the adver-
sarial learning module as the encryption module, and the
decryption module included fully-connected layers and the
softmax layer.
Decoder networks: Two decoder networks were imple-
mented following two inversion-attack strategies in Sec-
tion 3.2. Both of them were revised from U-net structures.
The original U-net (Ronneberger et al., 2015) consists of
eight blocks, and we revised each block to contain six con-
volutional layers for better reconstruction performance.
4.2. Datasets
We applied our approach to object classification (or fine-
grained classification) on three datasets, i.e. the CIFAR-10,
CIFAR-100 (Krizhevsky, 2009) and CUB200-2011 (Wah
et al., 2011) datasets. In addition, we also conducted face
attribute estimation on the CelebA dataset (Liu et al., 2015).
The CIFAR-10 dataset consists of 60K 32×32 color images
in 10 classes, with 6000 images per class. There are 50K
training images and 10K test images in the dataset. The
CIFAR-100 dataset has 100 classes containing 500 training
and 100 testing images per class. The CUB200-2011 dataset
contains a total of 11.8K bird images of 200 species for fine-
grained classification. All bird images in the CUB200-2011
datasets were cropped using their bounding boxes for both
training and testing. Implementation-wise, the final layer of
the decryption module in each neural network was revised
to output the correct number of categories, which are 10,
100, 200 respectively for the three datasets. The average
top-1 classification accuracy was reported for evaluation.
The CelebA dataset contains more than 200K celebrity im-
ages, each with 40 attribute annotations. The dataset covers
large pose variations and background clutter with great di-
versity, a large quantity and rich annotations. Face images
in the CelebA dataset were all cropped using their bounding
boxes for both training and testing. The final layer of the
decryption module was revised to produce 40 attributes for
each facial image. The average estimation error rate for
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Figure 5. CelebA images reconstructed from ‘encrypted’ features on a variety of AlexNet-based neural networks.
Classification Error Rates
Dataset Original Network with Noise feature Noise feature Noise feature Ours
network additional layers γ = 0.2 γ = 0.5 γ = 1.0
LeNet CIFAR-10 19.78 21.52 24.15 27.53 34.43 17.95
LeNet CIFAR-100 51.45 49.85 56.65 67.66 78.82 49.76
ResNet-56-α CIFAR-100 53.26 44.38 57.24 61.31 74.17 44.37
ResNet-110-α CIFAR-100 50.64 44.93 55.19 61.12 71.31 50.94
VGG-16 CUB-200 56.78 63.47 69.20 99.48 99.48 78.50
AlexNet CelebA 14.17 9.49 – – – 15.94
Reconstruction Errors
Dataset Original Network with Noise feature Noise feature Noise feature Ours Ours
network additional layers γ = 0.2 γ = 0.5 γ = 1.0 dec(<[x exp(−iθˆ)]) dec(x)
LeNet CIFAR-10 0.0769 0.1208 0.0948 0.1076 0.1274 0.2405 0.2353
LeNet CIFAR-100 0.0708 0.1314 0.0950 0.1012 0.1286 0.2700 0.2483
ResNet-56-α CIFAR-100 0.0929 0.1029 0.1461 0.1691 0.2017 0.2593 0.2473
ResNet-110-α CIFAR-100 0.1050 0.1092 0.1483 0.1690 0.2116 0.2602 0.2419
VGG-16 CUB-200 0.1285 0.1202 0.1764 0.0972 0.1990 0.2803 0.2100
AlexNet CelebA 0.0687 0.1068 – – – 0.3272 0.2597
Table 2. Experimental results.
all attributes of all facial images was used to evaluate the
performance of a neural network.
4.3. Baselines
We compared our proposed method against three baselines
from both perspectives of the model utility and the privacy
protection. These baseline neural networks were constructed
on the basis of the neural network structures described in
Section 4.1, but were tweaked for different purposes. Fig. 2
gives an overview of the baseline network structures. For a
fair comparison, each group of neural networks in compar-
isons were divided in the same way.
The first baseline (the top one in Fig. 2) was the original
neural network, from which our complex-valued network
was modified. The neural network did not contain any
adversarial-learning module without modifying functions of
its intermediate layers.
In the second baseline network, we injected noises to the
features released by the “encryption” module. The quotes
indicate that there was no actual encryption going on, but the
noisy feature a+ γ ·  was fed to the next layer instead of a,
serving as a perturbation-based privacy-preserving method.
Here  represented a high-dimensional random noise vector
with the same average activation magnitude as a. We set
γ = 0.5, 1.0, 2.0 respectively, indicating the low, medium,
and high levels of noises.
Owing to the adversarial-learning module, the complex-
valued neural network consisted of additional layers which
may affect the task performance. To enable a fair compar-
ison, our third baseline network structure was constructed
Complex-Valued Neural Networks for Privacy Protection
Dataset Ours
ResNet-20-α CIFAR-10 0.7890
ResNet-20-β CIFAR-10 0.7859
ResNet-32-α CIFAR-10 0.7820
ResNet-32-β CIFAR-10 0.7843
ResNet-44-α CIFAR-10 0.8411
ResNet-44-β CIFAR-10 0.7853
ResNet-56-α CIFAR-10 0.8088
ResNet-56-β CIFAR-10 0.8283
ResNet-110-α CIFAR-10 0.8048
ResNet-110-β CIFAR-10 0.7818
LeNet CIFAR-10 0.7884
LeNet CIFAR-100 0.8046
ResNet-56-α CIFAR-100 0.7898
ResNet-110-α CIFAR-100 0.7878
VGG-16 CUB-200 1.5572
AlexNet CelebA 0.8500
Table 3. Average error of the estimated rotation angle θ.
by adding layers, which were the same as the adversarial-
learning module but did not contain the adversarial-learning
loss.
To test the privacy-protection performance, we mimicked
an adversary trying to reconstruct the input from features
released by the encryption module. In the experiments,
we respectively trained decoder networks for each group
of neural networks shown in Fig. 2. The decoder net-
work followed the structure as described in Section 4.1,
but took the input-feature pairs as inputs. For the complex-
valued neural network, we applied the two decoding strate-
gies dec(<[x exp(−iθˆ)]) and dec(x), as introduced in Sec-
tion 3.2 to reconstruct the input.
Adversary decoders can be learned as follows. An adver-
sary can prepare a set of training samples, and repeatedly
send each training sample I several times to our encryption
module to retrieve the corresponding encrypted features for
I . Theoretically, the true phase θ∗ and the original feature
a can be recovered. Given I , a, and θ∗, a decoder can be
learned to invert features.
4.4. Experimental Results
Our experimental results are summarized in Tables 1, 2,
3, 4, and results of feature inversion are visualized in
Figs. 3, 4, 5. The results show that our method outper-
formed all baselines in privacy performance, at the cost of a
limited decrease of the task accuracy.
Three metrics were used to evaluate the privacy performance
of a neural network. The first metric was the pixel-level re-
construction error Eijk|Iˆijk−Iijk|, where I was the ground-
truth, and Iˆ denoted the reconstructed input: values of the in-
put were normalized to the range of 0 ≤ Iijk ≤ 1. The sec-
ond metric was given as the expected value of |θ∗−θˆ|, where
θˆ = maxθD
′(<[x exp(−iθ)]), indicating the difficulty of
recovering the true phase from the encrypted feature. The
third metric was the failure rate of image re-identification
— we asked five human annotators to view mixed pairs of
the original inputs and the reconstructed inputs to decide
whether or not they could use the reconstruction result to
identify the input. The average failure rate of image re-
identification was reported over all annotators.
Tables 1 and 2 list classification errors and reconstruction er-
rors w.r.t. different neural network structures across datasets.
Table 3 reports the error of the estimated best rotation an-
gle. Table 4 shows the failure rate of image re-identification
based on reconstructed images, which were labeled by hu-
man annotators. All these results demonstrate that our
method exhibited significant superior performance in pri-
vacy protection to baselines. Compared to baseline networks
with noisy features, our complex-valued features better pre-
served the discrimination power of the original neural net-
work while better preventing the adversary from recovering
the input.
5. Conclusion and Discussions
In this paper, we focus on the privacy-preserving problem
of intermediate-layer neural network features being trans-
ferred from local devices to public clouds. We develop a
novel method which transforms a traditional neural network
into a complex-valued one, preventing the adversary from
recovering input information from the processed features.
Our method has been tested on a variety of datasets and
neural networks, and shows superior performance in de-
fending feature inversion attacks with only moderate loss of
accuracy.
Theoretically, not only the encrypted feature, but also all
other intermediate-layer features in the processing module
can preserve privacy. However, we only need to invert the
encrypted feature to test the privacy-preserving performance,
since all features in following layers can be regarded as
functions of the encrypted feature. Thus, we can roughly
consider the encrypted feature’s performance as the lower
bound of other features.
Our method can be considered to conform to k-anonymity in
the sense that the encrypted feature cannot be distinguished
from at least k − 1 other synthetic features.
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Proof of Φ(eiθx) = eiθΦ(x)
In this paper, we design the processing module to ensure features of all layers are rotated by the same angle, in order to
enable the later decryption of the feature.
x(0) = a+ bi
x(θ) = eiθx(0)
}
⇒ ∀j, f (θ)j = eiθf (0)j
where f (θ)j and f
(0)
j represent the feature map computed using the input x
(θ) and that computed using the input x(0),
respectively.
In order to prove the above equation, we revise basic layers/operations in the processing module to ensure
Φ(eiθx) = eiθΦ(x)
where Φ(·) denotes the function of a certain layer/operation. x is given as the input of the specific layer/operation Φ(·).
Based on this equation, we can recursively prove f (θ)j = e
iθf
(0)
j .
Let us consider the following six commonest types of layers/functions to construct the processing module, i.e. the conv-layer,
the ReLU layer, the batch-normalization layer, the average/max pooling layer, the dropout layer, and the skip-connection
operation.
1. We revise the conv-layer by omitting the bias term. Thus, we get
Φ(eiθx) = w ⊗ [eiθx] = eiθ[w ⊗ x] = eiθΦ(x)
2. We replace the ReLU layer with the non-linear activation function of φ(xijk) =
‖xijk‖
max{‖xijk‖,c} · xijk. Thus, we can write
the element-wise operation as follows.
φ(eiθxijk) =
‖eiθxijk‖
max{‖eiθxijk‖, c} · [e
iθxijk] = e
iθ
[ ‖xijk‖
max{‖xijk‖, c} · xijk
]
= eiθφ(xijk)
3. We replace the batch-normalization layer with the function of φ(xlijk) =
xlijk√
Eijl[‖xlijk‖2]
. Thus, we can write the
element-wise operation as follows.
φ(eiθxlijk) =
eiθxlijk√
Eijl[‖eiθxlijk‖2]
= eiθ
[ xlijk√
Eijl[‖xlijk‖2]
]
= eiθφ(xlijk)
4. For the the average/max pooling layer and the dropout layer, we can represent their functions in the form of Φ(x) = Ax,
where x is given as a vectorized feature, and A denotes a matrix. For the average/max-pooling operation, A represents the
selection of neural activations. For the dropout layer, A contains binary values that indicate the dropout state. In this way,
we get
Φ(eiθx) = A(eiθx) = eiθ[Ax] = eiθΦ(x)
5. For the skip-connection operation, we get
Φ(eiθx) = eiθx+ Ψ(eiθx) = eiθ[x+ Ψ(x)] = eiθΦ(x)
where Ψ(·) denotes the function that is skipped by the connection. We can recursively ensure Ψ(eiθx) = eiθΨ(x).
